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ABSTRACT
While recognizing the importance of  a  wide range of  in￿uences on current
patterns of  globalization  in developing countries,  this paper  focuses  on the
role played by information technologies of various kinds. It is argued that
these technologies are associated with a number of powerful cumulative
mechanisms causing some countries  to  grow  rapidly  and  others to  become
increasingly marginalized from the global economy. These differential
effects of information technology on patterns of globalization are better
viewed from the perspective of Myrdal’s notion of cumulative causation
than from the standpoint of standard economic theory
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1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the economic characteristics of
information  technology (de￿ned broadly to include not only new forms
of communications but also industrial machinery), and thereby gain a
better understanding of its probable effects on the global economy.
Although technical change in general and information technology in
particular, are now widely accepted as being important  determinants of
productivity and growth  within particular  countries, their effects on the
patterns of the global economy have yet to be systematically analysed.
In attempting this task our goal is not at all, however, to make the case
for technological determinism i.e. the notion that technology is the sole
in￿uence over these patterns of global integration. Our argument is
rather, that if poor countries are to exploit the advantages afforded by
information technology for integrating themselves more fully into the
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DOI: 10.1080/09692290010010281global  economy,  they will  need to  be fully conversant  with  its  numerous
characteristics and the resulting impulses that it is likely to propagate
(such as, for example, how it will alter the nature of global competition
and the locational behaviour of multinational corporations).
Thus, while we fully acknowledge the wide range of in￿uences –
sociological,  political and economic – that provide the context in which
technology exerts its ultimate in￿uence on the global economy, we also
feel that there is something to be gained by simplifying this hugely
complex  pattern  of  relationships  (which,  in  any  case,  have  been  described
in several very lengthy books on the topic), and focusing instead on a
narrower (and comparatively neglected) set of issues that will be of
considerable relevance to politicians and other of￿cials in developing
countries which are entrusted with the formulation of policy towards
information  technology.  Indeed,  as  speci￿cally  argued  below,  one  reason
why  the  NICs,  more  than  any  other  group  of  developing countries,  have
been so successful in exploiting the advantages of global integration is
that these countries have fully understood the strategic characteristics
of information technologies and the cumulative interactions between
them. Among other things, for example, countries such as Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan recognized that:
Competition in an ongoing technological revolution calls for new
concepts and principles beyond those offered by the traditional
national comparative advantage. The informatics industry can 
lead  the  growth  and  technological  transformation  of  whole
economies. It also is characterized by intense global competi-
tion, fast technological change, complementarities and links and
uncertainties.  These characteristics  require, exact  timing for  market 
entry,  anticipation of  core  capabilities,  continuous  technology
learning, and development of supporting institutions and infra-
structures.
(Hanna et  al., 1996: 186)
2 PATTERNS OF GLOBALIZATION 
IN THE THIRD WORLD1
The uneven degree to which developing countries have participated in
the growth of foreign trade and investment (as a percentage of total
world output) has been thoroughly documented in a 1996 publication
by the World Bank entitled Global  Economic  Prospects  and the  Developing
Countries. All we shall attempt  to  do here therefore is to give the reader
an impression of just how uneven this process has in fact been.
With regard ￿rst to foreign trade, the afore-mentioned publication
notes that over the past decade the ‘overall ratio of trade to GDP [in 













































Folio 148the developing countries] – a common measure of integration – rose 
1.2 percentage points a year’ (World Bank, 1996: 20). Yet this average
increase for the developing world as a whole was heavily concentrated
among a small group of countries in East Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean. More precisely, the World Bank data indicate that as
much as ‘three-quarters of the increase was accounted for by just ten
countries’ (World Bank, 1996: 21). Over the same period, however, the
trade ratios actually fell in no fewer than 44 out of the 93 developing
countries  studied  by  the  World  Bank.  These  globally  disintegrative  expe-
riences were recorded for the most part in countries from the Middle
East and Africa.
An  equally extreme picture emerges from the World  Bank data  on the
foreign investment component of globalization. For, while developing
countries as a group experienced a rise in their share of global foreign
direct  investment,  there  were  pronounced  variations  around  this  average
performance.
On the one hand, it is again among a small group of countries that
the gains tend to be concentrated. Just 8 (mainly Asian) countries, for
example, ‘that account for 30 per cent of developing country GDP
garnered two  thirds  of overall FDI ￿ows  in 1990–93’ (World Bank, 1996:
22). On the other hand and again in parallel with the variations  around
the average trade  to  GDP  ratio  among developing countries,  a relatively
large number of such countries experienced falling ratios of foreign
investment to GDP. In particular, ‘Over the past decade ratios  of FDI to
GDP fell in thirty-seven of the ninety-three countries studied. Of these
twenty were in Sub-Saharan Africa, nine were in Latin America and the
Caribbean and seven were in the Middle East  and North  Africa’ (World
Bank, 1966: 22).2
3 GLOBALIZATION AS A TECHNOLOGICAL 
PHENOMENON
As de￿ned above, globalization is due partly to factors that are unre-
lated to technological change in general or information technology in
particular. Perhaps the most important of these other factors is the 
more liberal approach  to  international  trade  and foreign investment that
has been adopted in many countries, developed as well as developing.
As noted above, however, from the point of view of science and tech-
nology policy in developing countries, it is useful to abstract from all
these  other in￿uences on  globalization  and  focus  instead  on the respects
in which globalization  can  be described as  a technological  phenomenon.
It is useful to make this case in turn under four main headings, each 
of which, we will note, tends to involve different types of information
technology.













































Folio 149Communication technology and international trade
The level of international trade depends not only on transport costs 
but also on the costs of communication between buyers and sellers in
different countries.  But  whereas  nineteenth-century globalization  tended
to be driven by falling transport costs, it is now mainly the result of a
drastic  reduction in communication costs.  According to the World Bank
(1995)  for  example,  the  costs  of  an  international  telephone  call  have  fallen
by a factor of six between 1940 and 1970 and a factor of 10 between
1970  and 1990.  In fact,  there are  two  distinct  mechanisms  through  which
globalization  is currently  being driven  by a reduction in communication
costs. The ￿rst and more obvious mechanism is that because of tech-
nologies such as digital switching, fax machines and the Internet,
information about already traded goods can be communicated between
countries much more cheaply than was hitherto possible. This is mani-
fest, among other ways, in the growth of electronic commerce between
businesses, the digital delivery of goods and the retail sale of tangible
goods  (US Department  of  Commerce,  1998).3 The second  mechanism,  by
contrast, concerns the ability of information technology to bring certain
services that were formerly non-tradable into the realm of tradability:
In particular, rapid technological developments in telecommunica-
tions and computers in the 1980s have made some services,
especially information-intensive ones, more tradable by providing
‘the means for overcoming the inherent obstacle to trade in many
services . . . the  intangibility,  non-storability,  and  hence  non-
transportability of these services.
(UNCTAD, 1996: 105)
Information technology as a source of comparative advantage
According  to  the  standard  Heckscher–Ohlin  model  of  international  trade,
neither technical  change  in  general  nor  information  technology  in  partic-
ular would exert an in￿uence over the patterns of trade that are
associated with globalization (to which we referred above). For in that
model it is differences in factor and resource endowments, rather than
differences in production functions that determine the comparative
advantages  enjoyed by different countries.  Yet, as  Krugman has  pointed
out, empirical tests of the Heckscher–Ohlin model ‘have consistently
yielded negative results’ (Krugman, 1995: 345). The evidence indicates,
rather, that ‘patterns of comparative advantage are largely driven by
international differences in production functions. That is, technological
differences are a major engine of trade’ (Krugman, 1995:  345–6). To this
extent, therefore, it is reasonable to assume  that information technology
will indeed in￿uence the comparative advantage of countries; some













































Folio 150countries, that is to say, will become more competitive as a result of
adopting industrial technologies such as CAD/CAM or numerically
controlled machine tools, while other countries will tend to lag behind
and may even suffer a consequent loss of competitiveness in markets
where they compete with adopting countries.
International trade in information technologies
So far we have been concerned with the use of information  technologies
in promoting  globalization  and shaping the form that  it is likely to  take.
These technologies, however, are also produced and exported by devel-
oping countries and as such contribute to the trade component of total
world output. In fact, since international trade in many types of infor-
mation technology (such as of￿ce and telecommunications equipment)
has been growing more rapidly than trade in most other products, it
has, in effect, helped to raise the overall ratio of trade to total global
output (it has helped, that is to say, to promote the trade component of
globalization). Between 1983 and 1993, for example, trade in of￿ce and
telecommunications  equipment grew more  rapidly  than all other  sectors
(James, 1999).
Information technology and foreign direct investment
As we have de￿ned the term, however, globalization also refers to the
increasing ratio of foreign investment to world output and we need
accordingly  to  ask  how  this  component  of  globalization  has  been  affected
by information technologies of one kind or another. 
For this purpose, one can do no better than to quote from Dunning
and Narula (1996) on how information technology has enhanced the
ability of multinational corporations to coordinate their cross-border
activities. In their view:
It is a fundamental feature of MNE [multinational enterprise]
activity  that  cross-border  market  failure  exists  in  the  supply  of  inter-
mediate  products,  and  especially  intangible  assets.  ICT  [information
and  computer  technologies]  has  reduced  both  the  costs  of  acquiring
and disseminating information, and the transaction and coordi-
nation costs associated with cross-border activity. This is on at 
least two levels. First, information about both input and output
markets is more easily accessible. This allows ￿rms which previ-
ously could not engage in international business transactions  now
to do so. . . . Second, MNEs are better able to integrate the activi-
ties of their various  af￿liates  through the use of these technologies
and to more quickly respond to changing conditions in the coun-
tries in which they operate. Taken together, these transaction-cost













































Folio 151reducing processes have enabled MNE activity to be much more
ef￿ciently organised across borders.
(Dunning and Narula, 1996: 8–9)
Such  activity,  one  should  note,  refers  not  only  to  the  production  of  goods
and services by foreign af￿liates but also to expenditures by them on
R&D.  Note  too,  that  the  in￿uence  of  information  technology  on  the  global
activities of multinationals is not con￿ned to the patterns of intra-￿rm
behaviour  described  in  this  quotation.  For,  information  technologies  such
as fax machines, e-mail and software programs also allow ‘substantial
cost-savings in the coordination and monitoring costs associated with
inter-￿rm networks (Dunning and Narula, 1996:  9, emphasis in the orig-
inal). Partly for this reason one can discern a growing tendency for
multinational  ￿rms  to  engage  in  strategic  alliances  of  one  kind  or  another,
especially, but not only in the ￿eld of information technology itself
(Freeman and Hagedoorn, 1995). 
4 USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
TO PROMOTE GLOBALIZATION: 
A TYPOLOGY OF POLICIES
The ￿rst column of Table 1 contains a summary of the mechanisms 
that were described in the previous section, while the second column
indicates  the  type(s)  of  information  technology  to  which  each  such  mech-
anism mainly refers. This information, however, pertains only to the
potential in￿uence of these technologies on the nature and extent of
globalization. Whether this potential is actually realized depends partly
(as noted earlier) on the initial conditions  prevailing in particular  devel-
oping countries (with respect, for example, to the capacity to invest in
and absorb the new technology). But the degree to which the potential
for globalization afforded by this technology is actually realized, also
depends on the policies adopted by particular countries with respect to
each of the rows shown in Table 1.
This  important  point  can  perhaps  be  made  most  cogently  by
contrasting  the  group  of  developing countries  that  has  most  purposively
promoted  information  technology  as  an  instrument  of  globalization,  with
the group that has done least in this regard. The former category refers
primarily to the East Asian NICs which have adopted a wide range of
policies with respect to each and every one of the mechanisms shown
in  Table 1.  The second  category  includes a  much larger  number of  coun-
tries, mainly, but not entirely in sub-Saharan Africa, that has done little
or nothing to  exploit the potential  of information  technology as  a means
of globalization, along those same dimensions. In this way, such initial
conditions as favoured the former category over the latter in exploiting
the new technologies became more pronounced and the resulting gap













































Folio 152was  accentuated  still  further  by  the  cumulative  patterns  of  causation  that
will be described in the following section.
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to document all the respects
in which the East Asian NICs have used information technology as a
means of integrating themselves ever more closely into the global
economy. What we have done instead is to list in the third column of
Table  1  some  of  the  most  important  such  policy  measures,  corresponding
to each of the mechanisms through which information technologies of
various kinds promote globalization. The ￿rst entry in that column,
relating  to  digital  switching  technology,  warrants  special  emphasis  partly
because of the centrality of telecommunications to most other areas of
information technology and partly because the NIC experience in this
regard demonstrates that technological leapfrogging is indeed possible
under certain circumstances.
Switching technology forms the central part of the telecommunica-
tions network and the electronics or digital version of this technology
is superior in many respects to the older electro-mechanical switching
systems. Being more easily built from scratch than integrated into the
older systems, however, electronic switching was more readily acces-
sible  to  (developing)  countries  that  (unlike  the  developed  countries)  were
not yet burdened by large pre-existing stocks of those older systems.
Indeed, developing countries were given ‘a remarkable opportunity to
completely leapfrog the electromechanical technology, avoiding the
expense of replacing obsolete (though young in age) capital stock and
problems of technological cumulativity, and start their telecommunica-
tions infrastructure from scratch’ (Antonelli, 1990:  71). This opportunity
was grasped mainly by the Asian NICs which indeed were able to
leapfrog  by  assimilating  the  new  technology  more  rapidly  than  the  devel-
oped countries. ‘The most striking case is that of South Korea, where
diffusion reached the 10 per cent benchmark in 1981, four years after
the United States, but then reached 70.3 per cent in 1987.. . . Singapore
started from a low of 5 per cent in 1977, to arrive at 64.5 per cent in
1987’  (Antonelli,  1990:  44).  Partly  on  account  of  the  technological  leapfrog-
ging thus achieved, the NICs were able to record very rapid rates of
growth  in  the  number  of  main  telephone  lines  per 100  inhabitants.  South
Korea,  for  example,  ‘multiplied  its  number  of  main  lines  by  ￿ve,  jumping
from 4.2 per cent in 1977 to 20.7 per cent in 1987’ (Antonelli, 1990: 71).
If in this and the other policy areas listed in Table 1, the NICs were
therefore able to use information technology so effectively as a means
of integrating themselves into the global economy, there were many
other countries that had barely formulated any sort of coherent policy
response to the new technologies. Indeed, according to one observer of
the  Africa  region,  for  example,  ‘The guidance  of  policy  makers  has  made
telecom operations management inef￿cient and incompetent in decision



























































































Table  1 Information technology policies to promote globalization in the NICs
How  Form  of  Selected  policies  used  by  the  East
globalization  is information  Asian  NICs
promoted technology
Trade is promoted  Communication  ‘In telecommunications infrastructure, 
by a reduction in  technologies  the NICs have adopted digital, 
communication  (e.g. Fax, mobile  electronics-based systems faster than 
costs and  phones, e-mail)  advanced countries have. Less 
information  and telecom- committed to older technologies and 
imperfections munications  suppliers, they leaped to advanced 
infrastructure electronics’ (Hanna et  al., 1996: 190).
Adoption of  Industrial  ‘Advances in computing and 
information  technologies such  telecommunications in the 1980s 
technology  as CAD/CAM and shifted the focus ... towards 
enhances  NCMTs  exploiting this generic technology to 
comparative  (numerically  increase productivity and 
advantage of  controlled machine  competitiveness. The user-oriented 
adopting ￿rms  tools). strategy of Singapore is clearly a 
and countries  successful model and it suggests that 
at expense of  the main returns from the IT 
non-adopters revolution come from wide diffusion. 
Diffusion programs of the NICs have 
also emphasized low-cost extension 
of relatively mature applications’ 
(Hanna et  al., 1996: 214–15).
Rapid growth of  Electronics  ‘The desire to “catch up” and export, 
electronics exports  (e.g. computers,  helped shape the external outlook of 
raises ratio of trade peripherals,  policymakers . . . in Japan and the 
to global output diodes) NICs. Their orientation has been 
most pronounced in dynamic 
industries like electronics’ 
(Hanna et  al., 1996: 188).
Information  Information  ‘Intelligent infrastructures have . . .
technology  technology supported . . . international strategic 
promotes strategic  in general alliances’ (Hanna et  al., 1996: 184). 
alliances by ‘The ￿rst-tier NICs have invested . . .
multinational  in their own technological 
corporations capabilities, to become attractive 
partners for strategic alliance’ 
(Hanna et  al., 1996: 214).
Source: First two columns based on James (1999).making. Such arrangements have blocked visions towards  deregulation
and increased con￿ict in adopting the most appropriate deregulation
and privatization models based on national situations’ (Adam, 1996:
137–8). 
Other observers of that region have noted how government policies
have sometimes discouraged the adoption of computers as when, for
instance, import and other taxes are levied on these products (Wangwe
and Musonda, 1998).
We turn now to examine how the effects of the policy differences
between countries that have just been described, were intensi￿ed still
further by underlying patterns of cumulative causation in the global
economic  system.  Before so  doing, however, it is well to emphasize that
our argument in this section is not that information technology alone
has been responsible for the successful global integration of the NICs.
Our view, rather, is that this form of technology is merely one among
many other factors that have contributed to this outcome. By isolating
the relatively neglected technological  variable, we are hoping to redress
the existing imbalance in the literature.
5 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CUMULATIVE
CAUSATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
As espoused by Myrdal in his Economic Theory and Under-Developed
Regions (1957),  the  notion  of  cumulative  causation  is  fundamentally  a  cri-
tique  of  the  idea  of  a  stable  equilibrium,  on  which  neo-classical  economic
theory in general and international trade theory in particular so heavily
rely. For, whereas this latter concept implies that an initial change will
‘regularly  call  forth’  a  set  of  counterveiling  changes  in  the  ‘opposite  direc-
tion’ (Myrdal, 1957: 13), Myrdal suggests instead that, in general:
there is no such tendency towards automatic self-stabilisation . . .
The system is by itself not moving towards any sort of balance
between forces, but is constantly on the move away from such a
situation. In the normal case a change does not call forth counter-
vailing changes but, instead, supporting changes, which move the
system in the same direction as the ￿rst change but much further.
(Myrdal, 1957: 13)
For Myrdal, the principle of cumulative causation applies as much
between as within countries and with reference to both cases his
contention  is  that  unfettered  ￿ows  of  capital  and  free  trade  tend  to  favour
the richer and more prosperous regions at the expense of the poorer.
For in both cases  the growing regions ‘will exert a strong  agglomerative
pull, accelerating  their  rate  of growth  and bringing stagnation  or  decline
in other parts. No offsetting forces arise to prevent the acceleration of













































Folio 155this shift of economic activity from decadent to progressive regions’
(Higgins, 1959: 275). The former regions, that is to say, tend to suffer
from the ‘backwash effects’ of expansion in the latter.
In the international context, there are a large number of factors that
could  precipitate  a  cumulative  spiral  of  this  kind  (including,  for  example,
an unfavourable movement in the terms of trade for the poorer regions
of the world). Our concern here, however, is with the cumulative mech-
anisms  that  are  associated speci￿cally with the spread of information
technologies  of  one kind  or  another. Note that  Table 1 does not capture any
such mechanisms because it re￿ects only the individual contributions
made by these technologies to global integration. Note also that by
increasing the scope for international trade and foreign investment
through the mechanisms  described in that  table, information  technology
itself helps to create a global economic environment in which the
Myrdalian patterns of cumulative causation will operate most inten-
sively.
In order to describe the speci￿c forms of cumulative causation that
are associated with this form of technology, however, one needs to
recognize that it bears not only on the extent of global integration, but
also  on the form of competition  in the system  thus created.  In particular,
information technology has contributed to an environment in which:
it has become increasingly dif￿cult to become competitive by
focusing exclusively on low production costs. In former times,
performance on price was typically the key to gaining and losing
market shares, and this is still the case in some industries. Yet, in
most industries, focusing solely on price is no longer an effective
strategy for obtaining international competitiveness. The pressure
to produce and sell high-quality products in combination with
attractive  prices  requires high and  continuously  increasing  product
quality, timeliness of service, ￿exibility, rapid and continuous
innovation.
(OECD, 1993: 98)
As an illustration of this new form of competition and the role played
by information technology therein let us ￿rst consider the textile and
clothing  industry,  where,  according  to  Elson,  the  ‘application  of  computer
technology’  has  given  rise  to  the  so-called  ‘quick  response  system’,  which
is characterized by ‘rapid information ￿ows between the retailer, the
clothing manufacturer, the textile mill and the ￿bre producer, permit-
ting delivery of garments to the shops within a shorter period of time’
(Elson, 1994: 206–7). In practice, this system is well illustrated by the
way in which:
Liz Claiborne’s international network has linked clothing factories
in  China,  Hong  Kong,  Korea,  the  Phillipines,  Singapore,  and  Taiwan













































Folio 156in  an  EDI [electronic  document  interchange]  system  linked  to  head-
quarters in New York. This system coordinates  ￿fty steps between
raw goods delivery, and ￿nal product, reducing sample approval
and production changeover time from days to hours. EDI systems
have enabled  Hong Kong’s clothing manufacturers to remain
competitive.
(Hanna et  al., 1996: 146)
The in￿uence of the new competition is also being felt in the footwear
industry where for ￿rms such as Nike, ‘Reaction times to market shifts
and  competitor  strategy  are  becoming increasingly  important’  (Donaghu
and Barff, 1990: 546). And no less than in textiles and clothing, this
demand  for  speed and  ￿exibility in  the  global  market  place  is  being met,
among  other  ways,  by the  use  of  information  technology.  To  quote  again
from the Nike case, for example, it is notable that:
Design and marketing are done by the parent ￿rm, with new
designs relayed by satellite to a computer-aided manufacturing
(CAD/CAM) facility  run by a subcontractor  in Taiwan  Province of
China. Prototypes are constructed and modi￿ed, and ￿nal plans
are sent by facsimile to subcontractors  throughout the region.
(UNCTAD, 1993: 120).
The main point we wish to  draw from the examples that  have just been
provided, as  well as  from  many others  that  could easily be cited,4 is  that
participation in the new form of competition by any particular devel-
oping  country  appears  to  be  predicated  on  the  availability  of  information
technology in one form or another. And it is not without good reason
that  the  developing  countries  cited  in  those  examples  tended  to  be  drawn
from the East  Asian NICs, for  it  is  there that  information  technology  has
been diffused most widely. Poorer regions by contrast will ￿nd them-
selves excluded from the new competition by the unavailability of such
technology, regardless of how large a labour cost advantage they may
enjoy. ‘Africa’s comparative advantage of surplus labour relative to
capital’,  for  example,  is  described  by one  author  as  ‘becoming  irrelevant’
(Adam,  1996:  35).  Expressed in  Myrdalian  terms,  what  this means  is  that
Africa and certain other relatively poor developing countries will tend
to suffer from ‘the backwash effect’ of the introduction of information
technologies in other, more advanced regions.5
What is more, the inegalitarian impact on developing countries thus
induced by the new technologies will be intensi￿ed still further by a
number of forces acting in the cumulative manner that Myrdal would
have predicted. The ￿rst of these has to do with the closeness of the
relationship between foreign investment and exports that information
technology itself has  helped to  foster.  In particular,  through its ‘distance
shrinking’ effects, this technology permits multinational corporations  to













































Folio 157disperse their global production activities to a far greater extent than
was  hitherto possible and what  emerges as  a result  is a correspondingly
larger number of export platforms in an integrated system of produc-
tion spread across a variety of different countries. ‘Foreign af￿liates’,
that  is to  say,  ‘no  longer need to  be freestanding and  miniature versions
of parent ￿rms. Rather, they can ful￿l specialized tasks in the frame-
work of a global intra-￿rm division of labour, and trade the results via
international communication networks’ (UNCTAD, 1996: 106).
In  the  developing  countries  that  manage  to  form  part  of  such  networks,
therefore, af￿liates tend to be platforms for exports and to this extent,
the initial globalizing in￿uence exerted by foreign direct investment is
compounded by the trade dimension of globalization. These two compo-
nents of globalization,  that  is to  say,  are not independent of one another
(as is suggested in Table 1), but  are  instead  closely  intertwined  in  the  global
system  that  information  technology has  helped  to  create. This relationship is
made still closer,  moreover,  by the fact that  knowledge spill over, in the
form of technology diffusion by multinationals to local suppliers often
enables the latter to enter export markets as well. ‘Several developing
countries’, for example, ‘have been able to improve their export perfor-
mance due to  the export activities  of foreign af￿liates  and of  indigenous
￿rms with linkages to them’ (UNCTAD, 1995: 224).
Given the relationships described in the two previous paragraphs, it
is hardly surprising that foreign investment should turn out to be a
major determinant of export performance in developing countries. At
least one empirical analysis of the issue, for example, has found that
‘export competitiveness [in developing countries] is signi￿cantly in￿u-
enced by the activities of foreign-owned ￿rms within the domestic
economy’ (Narula and Wakelin, 1995: 21). Nor, one should emphasize,
is the observed closeness of the connection between foreign investment
and export performance, the only link in the ultimate chain of cumula-
tive causation that we are here seeking to describe. For, to the extent
that  exports lead to  economic  growth,  still more foreign investment will
tend to be forthcoming since multinationals are generally attracted to
fast-growing countries, as opposed to those that are not growing or
growing less rapidly. At some point in this cumulative process, more-
over, agglomeration economies are also likely to make their presence
felt, favouring countries with an initial locational advantage at the
expense of  countries that  are initially  disadvantaged.6 In this  way,  there-
fore, any initial locational advantages enjoyed by one particular group
of countries are likely to cumulate rather than narrow over time (as the
experience of the Asian NICs in relation to other developing countries
amply seems to demonstrate).
Whereas the cumulative processes that have just been described turn
mainly on the inter-relationships between foreign direct investment,













































Folio 158exports and economic growth, another chain of causation begins with
the  recognition  that the  generation  of  new  technology  cannot  be
separated from the subsequent patterns of its adoption and diffusion
and hence, ultimately, its impact on international competitiveness and
globalization.  More  speci￿cally,  what  has  to  be  recognized  is  that  because
the diffusion of new knowledge is usually far from perfect (especially
from developed to developing countries), ‘self-reinforcing advantages’
tend to accrue to the ￿rms and countries in which the new technology
originates. While some ￿rms and countries, that is to say, will be able
continuously to appropriate for themselves the stream of innovations
thus engendered, other ￿rms and countries, for one reason or another,
will remain excluded and the gap in competitiveness between the two
groups will accordingly tend to widen over time.
In  the  speci￿c  case  of  information  technology,  much  of  the  new  knowl-
edge that  is  created  seems  to  emerge  from  the  strategic  alliances  referred
to earlier (most of which, in turn, are formed in the area of information
and other new technologies). Although the participants in most such
alliances  are located  in the developed countries,  some ￿rms  from devel-
oping countries  have also  been engaged in  the  process.  According  to  the
most recent data  from among the latter group of countries,  ‘￿rms based
in East Asia were particularly active in forming alliances. Records
involving  Asian  ￿rms  (excluding  the  Asian  republics  of  the  former  Soviet
Union) accounted  for 61.6  per cent of the total for non-OECD countries’
(Vonortas and Sa￿oleas, 1997: 664). ‘The large majority of IT [informa-
tion technology] alliances’ in which these ￿rms were engaged, led, it
seems,  to  ‘the  creation,  exchange,  or  transfer  of  technological  knowledge’
(Vonortas and Sa￿oleas, 1997: 668). And by means of the knowledge
thus acquired, the ￿rms concerned would better be able ‘to compete in
international  IT markets’. As such and in light of the fact  that  the acqui-
sition of knowledge in information technology is itself cumulative in
character,  what  appears to  be happening is that  the existing competitive
advantages  bestowed  by this  technology  on  the  East  Asian  NICs,  in  rela-
tion to most other developing countries, are becoming ‘self-reinforcing’
in a process of continuous technical change.7 (This again, we should
emphasize, is not a chain of  causation  that  is  captured in Table 1,  where
the generation and diffusion of information technology are implicitly
treated as separate processes).
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has sought to contribute to our understanding of the highly
unequal patterns of globalization exhibited by developing countries 
over the past decade or so. We have argued that these patterns can 
be explained partly by differences in the degree to which developing













































Folio 159countries  have  exploited  the  various  ways  in  which  information
technology  can  serve  as  an  instrument  of  integration  into  the  global  econ-
omy. Some countries, it seems, have explicitly sought to exploit the full
range of integrative possibilities afforded by this technology and they
have also  bene￿ted from a number of powerful cumulative mechanisms
that have further enhanced the extent of their integration (via inter-
national trade and foreign investment) into the global economy. Other
countries,  by contrast,  have  made  little  effort  to  exploit  information  tech-
nology as a tool for globalization and they may indeed have suffered
from the  accompanying  ‘backwash’  effects of  the expansion  of  trade  and
foreign investment in the former group of countries. These differential
effects  of  information  technology  on  globalization  need  thus  to  be  viewed
from the perspective of Myrdal’s notion of cumulative causation,  rather
than a framework which envisages the technological (or indeed any 
other form of) convergence of developing countries with one another.
It  also  follows  from  the  Myrdalian framework  that  countries currently
being marginalized by the processes of globalization need to embark
upon a concerted set of policy measures that will redress the situation.
Indeed:
The  hypothesis  of  circular  causation,  which  tends  to  be the  doctrine
of despair for the poorer countries as long as they leave things to
take their natural course, holds out glittering prizes for a policy 
of purposive interferences. Applied to a goal-directed national
endeavour  it  promises  results  much  bigger than  the  efforts implied
– if the efforts succeed in starting a cumulative process upwards.
(Myrdal, 1957: 85)
The point here is that in principle cumulative causation can cut both
ways. On the one hand, as emphasized above, it can operate to make
poor countries even poorer. But with the appropriate choice of policy
instruments, it can produce positive results that are much greater than
the sum of the individual instruments  (as evidenced, most forcefully by
the experience of the East Asian ‘tigers’). 
NOTES
1 The following two sections draw heavily on James (1999).
2 The quotation as a whole is taken from James (1999: 10).
3 For a full discussion of these emerging phenomena see US Department of
Commerce, 1998.
4 In  the  case  of  service  activities,  for  example,  there is  a  potentially  vast  market
in offshore data processing. The Caribbean region appears to have been
particularly  successful  in attracting  foreign investment in this type of  service
activity.
5 In the clothing industry, for example, ‘a new phase of technological advan-
ces, new marketing strategies focused on very short life cycles’ have had













































Folio 160‘consequent impacts on the exports of many developing countries, where
the modern version of transnational putting-out had been practised for  over
a decade’ (Chesnais, 1995: 19).
6 The importance of agglomeration economies in the locational decisions of
multinational corporations has been demonstrated empirically by Wheeler
and Mody (1988).
7 See also the discussion in Freeman and Hagedoorn (1995).
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